Azad Kashmir: More Than a Local Authority

 

Azad Kashmir: More Than a Local Authority

 By Sardar Aftab Khan

 A persistent misconception has begun to take root in policy discussions and even among some senior legal minds: that the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) is nothing more than a local administrative authority, limited in both scope and purpose to the territory it currently governs — stretching from Chamb (Bhimber) to Taobutt (Neelum).

 At first glance, this view appears grounded in a straightforward reading of the AJK Interim Constitution, 1974. After all, the Government’s executive authority is indeed exercised within the areas presently under its administration. But this interpretation, while partially correct, is fundamentally incomplete. It confuses territorial jurisdiction with constitutional identity, and in doing so, risks undermining both.

 To understand what AJK is — and what it is not — one must begin with the AJK Interim Constitution, 1974 itself, but not selectively. The Preamble is not ornamental; it is foundational. It makes an unequivocal declaration:  “empowerment of the Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as being chosen representative of the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir to exhaustively exercise their legislative powers and executive authority, as the case may be, for the better governance, socio-economic development and in particular for general welfare of people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the sustained manner and other matters ancillary thereto besides pursuing and fostering our cause of securing self-determination under the UN Charter and according to the UNCIP Resolutions through the democratic method of free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations”.

 This is not a marginal clause. It is the constitutional basis for AJK’s very existence. The State of Jammu and Kashmir remains, in legal and political terms, an unresolved entity. AJK exists as an interim arrangement within that larger, unfinished question.

 This position is entirely consistent with international law. UN Security Council Resolution 47 (1948) and subsequent resolutions make clear that the final disposition of Jammu and Kashmir is to be determined through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under UN auspices.

 Thus, AJK is not merely a geographic entity; it is a constitutional response to an unresolved international dispute.

 It is in this context that Article 2 of the Constitution must be read. It defines Azad Jammu and Kashmir as the territories of the State that have been liberated by its people and are “for the time being” under the administration of the Government, along with any other territories that may come under its control in the future.

 The words “for the time being” are not incidental. Nor is the forward-looking reference to future territories. Together, they signal a provisional and transitional arrangement, not a final territorial settlement.

 In mature constitutional systems, territorial definitions are fixed and closed. Here, they are deliberately open-ended—because the State itself remains unresolved. To reduce this provision to a routine administrative clause is to ignore its context and intent.

 More importantly, the Constitution defines the governing entity as the “Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” This is not merely a stylistic choice. It is a constitutional assertion. This government does not derive its identity from a district boundary or a provincial framework; it claims continuity with the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole.

 A purely local authority does not, and cannot, constitutionally describe itself in such terms.

 The broader constitutional structure reinforces this point. The Legislative Assembly of AJK is empowered to legislate not only for the territory under its administration but also for State Subjects wherever they may be.

 This is a remarkable provision. It shifts the focus from geography to political community. It recognises that the people of the State — including those displaced or residing outside AJK — remain part of the same constitutional imagination.

 The inclusion of refugees from Indian-administered areas in the Assembly further underlines this logic. A local authority does not represent populations beyond its territorial jurisdiction. AJK does — because it is not merely a local authority. However, the popular demands of the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) for the complete abolition of 12 refugee seats in the AJK Assembly need to be reconciled with a correct understanding of their constitutional purpose and intent. Indeed, the methods, role and character of the members of the assembly elected on these 12 refugees are significant issues causing an electoral imbalance in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) Assembly, including federal interference from Pakistan, manipulation of seats for non-residents, and the disenfranchisement of AJK residents. Consequently, recent protest movements have further amplified demands for democratic reform and greater political autonomy. Therefore, the questions concerning the fixed 12 non-territorial refugee seats in the AJK Assembly and the ambiguities in their delimitation under the AJK Election Commission Act 2021 warrant serious consideration and immediate resolution through dialogue and appropriate constitutional amendments. 

 Even more telling is Article 11, which provides for the appointment of a Plebiscite Adviser to guide the Government in matters relating to a future plebiscite under UN resolutions.

 If AJK were only a local administrative unit, why would its Constitution embed a mechanism connected to an international, State-wide process? The answer is obvious: because AJK is structurally tied to the larger question of the State’s future.

 It is true, of course, that Pakistan retains responsibility for defence, external affairs, and matters arising under UNCIP resolutions. But this does not negate AJK’s constitutional role. It reflects a division of functions, not a denial of identity. Pakistan operates at the level of international obligations; AJK functions as an interim democratic structure representing the people under its administration, and in part, the wider State. The Foreign Office of Pakistan, in its statement (298/2025), 3 October 2025, reiterated that Pakistan remains firmly committed to the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in “upholding their dignity, safeguarding their rights, including the right to peaceful assembly and protest, respecting their sentiments, and advancing their socio-economic development. This commitment reflects not only our constitutional responsibility but also our enduring moral obligation to the people of Jammu and Kashmir”.

 The danger lies not in recognising AJK’s territorial limits — these are real and acknowledged. The danger lies in reducing its entire existence to those limits. Such a narrative carries serious consequences.

First, it weakens AJK’s constitutional standing, reducing it from an interim government of a disputed State to a routine administrative unit. Second, it creates space for arguments that AJK can be administratively restructured or absorbed without significant constitutional implications. Third, it dilutes the connection between AJK and the broader right of self-determination — a connection that is central to its legitimacy.

History offers a cautionary tale. Political entities that fail to articulate and defend their constitutional identity often find it redefined for them — sometimes irreversibly.

 This is not an argument against reform. On the contrary, AJK urgently requires institutional strengthening and democratic empowerment for restoring people's trust through participatory governance, enabling People’s Haq-e-Hakumat, Haq-e-Malkiyat, and greater accountability. But reform must be grounded in constitutional clarity, not conceptual confusion.

 The purpose should not be to shrink AJK’s identity, but to realise its full potential within the framework already provided by its Constitution. That Constitution does not describe a municipality. It describes an interim political entity rooted in a larger historical and legal reality.

 To read it otherwise is to mistake the part for the whole — and to risk losing both.

 Conclusion

The Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is not a municipal committee, a district council, or a routine local authority. It is an interim constitutional government born out of the unfinished political status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Its day-to-day administrative jurisdiction is undoubtedly confined to the territories presently under its control, but its constitutional purpose is far deeper and wider.

 The Preamble of the AJK Interim Constitution expressly anchors AJK’s existence in the unresolved future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the right of the people to determine that future through a free and fair plebiscite under UN auspices, the UN Charter and UNCIP Resolutions. Article 2 defines AJK as liberated territories under administration “for the time being” and even contemplates other territories coming under its administration in future. This language is provisional, transitional and State-wide in its constitutional imagination.

 Article 11 provides for a Plebiscite Adviser. Article 31 empowers legislation not only for the territory but for State Subjects wherever they may be. Article 22 gives representation to refugees from occupied areas. The Third Schedule and Article 56 recognise Pakistan’s responsibilities under UNCIP, but they do not extinguish AJK’s constitutional role; they allocate external and strategic responsibilities to Pakistan while preserving AJK’s representative and interim governmental character.

 Therefore, to say that the AJK Government cannot exercise police, taxation or judicial authority beyond its administered territory is legally correct. But to say that it has nothing to do with the wider Jammu and Kashmir dispute, the UN mechanism, the plebiscite framework, or the political rights of State Subjects is constitutionally false and strategically dangerous.

Such a narrow interpretation risks reducing AJK from an interim government of a disputed State into a disposable local authority. That would not empower the people; it would weaken their constitutional standing, dilute the right of self-determination, and open the door to administrative absorption into wider Pakistan’s federal administrative infrastructure. The correct path for the people’s movement is not to deny the constitutional depth of AJK, but to democratise it, empower its Assembly, restore people’s control over governance, and make its institutions accountable to the people whose name they carry.

About the author:

Sardar Aftab Khan is a public policy advocate, researcher and strategist for democratic reforms in Azad Jammu Kashmir. Over a 35-year career, he has championed recognition of Kashmiri national identity in the Census, people's rights, decentralised governance, and political inclusion. He can be reached at: aftab@kdfuk.org. Dated: 26 May 2026