The Future Design of the 12 Refugee Seats in the AJK Legislative Assembly

The Future Design of the 12 Refugee Seats in the AJK Legislative Assembly

A policy paper for legal, constitutional and policy discussion

Prepared by Sardar Aftab Khan

 Date: 13 May 2026

 

Executive Summary

This paper presents an objective comparison of three constitutional-policy options for the future of the 12 seats currently allocated to refugees from Jammu and Kashmir and Mangla Dam affectees settled in Pakistan. The purpose is not to advocate a single predetermined outcome, but to provide a structured basis for legal and institutional assessment.

The constitutional baseline is clear: the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, presently provides for 45 directly elected Assembly seats, comprising 33 constituencies in AJ&K and 12 constituencies in Pakistan for Kashmiri refugees. That structure is reflected in official AJ&K publications and means that any major redesign requires constitutional amendment rather than mere administrative adjustment.

At the same time, policy discussion has evolved in two directions. One line of argument emphasises resident democratic sovereignty and questions the continued role of directly elected non-resident constituencies. A second line emphasises the symbolic and constitutional importance of retaining some institutional acknowledgement of displacement, identity and the unresolved nature of the wider Jammu and Kashmir question. This paper, therefore, compares three options: full abolition, proportional reduction, and reserved-seat conversion plus reinvestment.

 1.    Purpose and Scope

This options paper is designed for lawyers, constitutional experts, legislators, civil servants and policy reviewers. It focuses on institutional design, legal feasibility, representational logic and implementation consequences. It does not attempt to decide historical claims or moral questions finally. Instead, it identifies the main constitutional and policy choices now available within the debate.

 2.    Existing Constitutional and Institutional Position

 The AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, provides that the Legislative Assembly includes 45 directly elected members, and official AJ&K statistical publications continue to record those 45 seats as 33 constituencies in AJ&K and 12 constituencies in Pakistan for Kashmiri refugees. This confirms that the present refugee-seat structure is not merely conventional or administrative; it is embedded in the formal constitutional order.

This matters because any proposal that materially alters the number, character or election method of these 12 seats necessarily raises constitutional rather than purely statutory questions. The available options, therefore, differ not only in political desirability but also in the depth of legal amendment they require.

 3.    Evaluation Criteria

·       Constitutional feasibility: whether the option can be implemented coherently within the AJ&K constitutional structure.

·       Democratic equality: whether the option reduces or preserves unequal vote weight.

·       Protection of displaced identity: whether the option preserves some constitutionally intelligible acknowledgement of refugees and conflict-displaced groups.

·       Institutional stability: whether the option is likely to be implemented without avoidable procedural disruption.

·       Contemporary relevance: whether the option reflects current socio-economic realities, including disability inclusion and diaspora engagement.

4.    Option A: Full Abolition of the 12 Refugee Seats

 Description

Under this option, all 12 seats presently associated with refugee constituencies in Pakistan would be removed entirely from the Assembly structure. The underlying rationale is that non-resident directly elected constituencies should not continue to shape the composition and government-formation dynamics of an Assembly governing the residents of AJ&K.

Strengths

·       It gives maximum effect to the principle of resident democratic sovereignty.

·       It directly addresses the critique that non-resident electorates should not hold kingmaker leverage in AJ&K politics.

·       It simplifies the direct-elected structure of the Assembly.

 

Risks and objections

·       It may be represented as a denial of refugee identity or as a weakening of the unresolved all-Jammu-and-Kashmir frame.

·       It removes institutional acknowledgement rather than recalibrating it.

·       It may face greater political resistance because it is easier to portray as erasure than as reform.

 

Legal implications

This option requires direct amendment of the constitutional provisions that presently sustain the 12-seat arrangement, followed by consequential statutory and rules amendments. Because the current 33-plus-12 arrangement is reflected in the constitutional text and in official AJ&K institutional publications, abolition cannot be treated as a mere delimitation exercise.

 5.    Option B: Proportional Reduction to Five Seats

Description

Under this option, the 12 seats would not be removed altogether. Instead, they would be reduced to a smaller number based on proportional voter strength. In the author's (Khan, 2025; Khan, 2026) prior reform proposal, a reduction to five seats has been justified on registered-voter calculations and largest-remainder logic.

Strengths

·       It preserves a constitutionally intelligible form of refugee voice while reducing disproportionality.

·       It is easier to present as recalibration rather than exclusion.

·       It responds to equality concerns without wholly abandoning symbolic recognition of displacement.

 

Risks and objections

·       If the five seats remain directly elected from outside AJ&K, some of the resident-sovereignty critique remains.

·       It may be attacked from both directions: as insufficient by abolitionists and as reductive by defenders of the status quo.

·       It still requires a constitutional amendment because the present structure is constitutionally fixed.

 

Legal implications

This option also requires a constitutional amendment, but it may be easier to defend institutionally because it modifies rather than erases the recognition principle. It would still require statutory alignment, fresh delimitation logic and a transition framework.

 6.    Option C: Reserved-Seat Conversion Plus Reinvestment

Description

Under this option, the present 12 directly elected refugee seats would be transformed rather than simply cut or abolished. A reduced bloc—such as five seats—would be retained, but no longer as direct constituencies in Pakistan. Instead, those seats would become reserved seats elected by the AJ&K Assembly in a manner parallel to existing reserved-seat categories. The remaining seven seats would then be reinvested into new inclusion categories.

A major contemporary variant of this option, discussed in this paper, recommends allocating the seven freed seats to two seats for persons with disabilities in AJ&K and five seats for diaspora/overseas Kashmiris and migrant workers from AJ&K living in the Middle East, Europe, North America, Australia and East Asia. This design draws some support from the fact that the AJ&K government has recently described overseas Kashmiris as a valuable asset, has held an Overseas Kashmiris Convention 2026 in Muzaffarabad, and has announced legal and digital reforms to facilitate diaspora investment and engagement.

Strengths

·       It answers the abolitionist critique by ending directly elected non-resident constituencies.

·       It answers the identity objection by preserving a protected, indirect form of displaced representation.

·       It creates space for present-day inclusion categories, especially disability representation and diaspora-linked engagement.

·       It aligns more naturally with the existing constitutional logic of reserved seats.

 

Risks and objections

·       It is more complex to draft because it changes both seat number and seat type.

·       Eligibility design for diaspora and migrant-worker representation would need careful statutory definition.

·       The larger the diaspora bloc becomes, the more carefully lawmakers would need to justify its relation to AJ&K’s constitutional structure and existing overseas-seat principles.

 

Legal implications

This option requires the broadest drafting effort but may also offer the most integrated settlement. It would require a constitutional amendment, statutory provisions for new reserved categories, and rules governing nomination and election mechanics. It may, however, fit more coherently with current government efforts to institutionalise overseas Kashmiris’ developmental role.

7.    Comparative Assessment

In purely resident-sovereignty terms, Option A is the clearest. In symbolic and constitutional continuity terms, Option B is the least disruptive. In institutional-design terms, Option C may offer the broadest balancing framework because it removes the present direct extra-territorial leverage while preserving protected recognition and opening a route to contemporary inclusion categories.

That does not mean Option C is automatically preferable. It means only that it has the widest balancing capacity if lawmakers decide that the goal is not simple subtraction, but redesign. Option A remains the most straightforward if the Assembly wishes to prioritise resident territorial accountability above all other considerations. Option B remains the narrowest recalibration model if lawmakers prefer minimal redesign.

 8.    Matters Requiring Counsel’s and high power committee Attention

·       Exact constitutional amendment pathway and majority threshold under the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974.

·       Consequential amendment requirements across the Elections Act and Elections Rules.

·       Whether reserved-seat conversion should mirror existing Assembly-elected reserved seats exactly or only broadly.

·       Eligibility rules for any diaspora or migrant-worker category, including residence, state-subject status and demonstrable links to AJ&K.

·       Transition arrangements for an election cycle following the amendment.

·       Potential judicial-review grounds based on equality, representational coherence, or ultra vires implementation.

9.    Conclusion

This paper does not recommend a single outcome. Its central conclusion is narrower: the present 12-seat structure is sufficiently significant and sufficiently embedded in the constitutional order that reform choices must now be treated as constitutional-policy options rather than as rhetorical positions. The three principal options are identifiable, and each carries distinct legal, democratic and institutional consequences. A serious decision-maker can therefore frame the choice as follows: whether to abolish, recalibrate, or redesign. The legal and policy value of this paper lies in clarifying that these are not the same act and should not be assessed as if they were.

About the Author

Sardar Aftab Khan is a public policy advocate, researcher and strategist for peacebuilding and democratic reforms in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. This paper is prepared as a professional discussion document for legislators, constitutional lawyers, policy specialists and institutional stakeholders. He can be contacted via email at aftab@kdfuk.org

Research Integrity and Drafting Disclosure

This document is the intellectual property of Sardar Aftab Khan. Artificial intelligence tools were used to assist with source discovery, legal comparison, cross-referencing, structural organisation and language refinement. All substantive judgments, selections, and final editorial decisions remain the responsibility of the author. This paper is presented as a neutral, non-advocacy options paper for professional discussion. It is intended to support legal and policy review rather than to substitute for formal advice by competent counsel.

 

References

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 Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (2021a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Elections (Amendment) Act, 2021 (Act I of 2021). Muzaffarabad: Law, Justice, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights Department.

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